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The federal government delivers substantial college aid through the tax code, after
introducing education tax credits in 1998 and a tuition deduction in 2002. The design of
the Lifetime Learning tax credit and the tuition deduction may make them particularly
useful to older students. This paper investigates how these provisions have aﬀected college
attendance of individuals in their 30s and 40s. For most adults, there is no eﬀect on
college attendance. Among men whose 1998 educational attainment falls short of early-
life educational expectations, eligibility for an education tax preference is associated with
a 2.5 to 3.4 percentage point increase in the probability of college attendance.
Starting in the late 1990s, the U.S. federal government has substantially expanded the
amount of college aid it provides through the tax system. Two higher education tax credits,
the Hope and Lifetime Learning tax credits, were introduced in 1998, and a tuition deduction
was introduced in 2002. Many authors have pointed out that tax-based aid is targeted to a
diﬀerent group of students than is traditional federal college aid: While Pell grants are primarily
for low-income individuals, tax-based aid tends to beneﬁt the middle class. The possibility that
tax-based college aid may be particularly useful to older students has been largely overlooked.
In this paper I investigate the role of recent federal tax incentives for higher education on the
college attendance decisions of adults in their 30s and 40s.
The Hope tax credit is designed for those who ﬁt the proﬁle of a traditional college student.
It is available only to students who are enrolled half-time or more in the ﬁrst two years of an
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1undergraduate degree-granting program. In contrast, there are several reasons why the Lifetime
Learning tax credit and tuition deduction may be particularly useful to older students. First,
the Lifetime Learning credit and tuition deduction apply to expenses incurred during any year
of higher education, including graduate school. They can be claimed for an unlimited number
of years per student. Second, the Lifetime Learning credit and tuition deduction do not require
recipients to be enrolled in degree-granting programs, and have no minimum hours of enrollment
requirement. Data from the U.S. Department of Education (2009, Table 191) show that 74% of
students ages 35 and older are enrolled part-time while only 23% of students ages 18 to 24 are
enrolled part-time. Third, expenses for room and board are not covered by any of the education
tax preferences. This may limit the usefulness of the tax provisions for students of traditional
college age, many of whom live on campus, but is unlikely to aﬀect the usefulness of the tax
beneﬁts for older students.
College enrollment rates among older individuals have been increasing since the 1970s, as
documented by Corman (1983) and Seftor and Turner (2002). Nontraditional students now
have a substantial presence in college classrooms. In 2007, students age 35 and older accounted
for about 17% of all students enrolled in degree-granting institutions and about 32% of part-
time students (U.S. Department of Education, 2009, Table 191). Adult college enrollment is
associated with an increase in wages. Leigh and Gill (1997) ﬁnd that the return to an associate’s
degree is of similar magnitude for younger students who have been continuously enrolled in
school and for older students who return after an enrollment gap. They also ﬁnd that the return
to non-degree community college coursework is 8 to 10% higher for men with an enrollment
gap. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2005) estimate the wage eﬀects of community college
enrollment using administrative data on displaced workers from the state of Washington. They
ﬁnd similar returns to a year of community college retraining for younger and older displaced
workers, estimating a 7% increase in the long-term earnings of older men and a 10% increase
for older women. In contrast, Light (1995) ﬁnds that the wage premium to delayed education,
while still positive, is lower for those with longer gaps between enrollment spells.
2The information available from tax return data suggests that older students are taking
advantage of education tax preferences. Public-use tax data report credits and deductions at the
level of the ﬁling unit, without identifying which member incurred any qualifying educational
expenses. However, in order for a parent to claim an education tax preference on behalf of
her child, the child must be a dependent. In 1998, 39.3% of returns claiming an education
credit had no exemptions for dependent children. Filers without dependent children claimed
approximately $969 million in education tax credits, 29% of all education tax credits claimed
in 1998.1 While the available evidence suggests that older individuals are claiming education
tax credits, less is known about the extent to which college enrollment decisions of adults are
being inﬂuenced by education tax preferences.
In this paper, I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth-1979 to estimate
ﬁxed eﬀects regressions that explain an individual’s college attendance as a function of eligibility
for education tax preferences. Individuals in this sample range in age from 33 to 41 in the year
that education tax credits were ﬁrst available. I make use of the variation in eligibility generated
by the introduction of the credits in 1998 and the tuition deduction in 2002. In my preferred
speciﬁcation, I instrument for eligibility by applying current-year tax law to income as of 1997,
just before tax provisions for college expenses were in eﬀect. For the full sample of men and
women, I ﬁnd no evidence that college attendance is aﬀected by the tax credits or tuition
deduction. I do ﬁnd evidence of a positive enrollment eﬀect among a subsample of adult men,
a group I refer to as “incomplete learners.” When ﬁrst surveyed as teenagers in 1979, NLSY79
respondents were asked about the highest grade or year of education they expected to complete.
I compare this expectation to actual educational attainment as of 1998. Among men whose 1998
educational attainment fell short of their 1979 expectations, being eligible for an education tax
preference is associated with a 2.5 to 3.4 percentage point increase in the probability of college
1I calculated these values using data from the 1998 sample of individual tax returns made available by the
Statistics of Income division of the IRS. The ages of ﬁlers and dependents are not reported. Thus I cannot
distinguish between the returns ﬁled by adults in their 30s or older and those ﬁled by students of traditional
college age who are no longer dependents for tax purposes. Because a ﬁler must have positive tax liability in
order to claim the non-refundable education credits, it seems plausible that older adults make up a larger share
of this group.
3attendance. This eﬀect is large and robust to a number of speciﬁcation checks. Despite the
large eﬀect on the college attendance of male incomplete learners, I ﬁnd no eﬀect of education
tax preferences on their degree completion.
1 Background on Higher Education Tax Preferences
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 substantially expanded federal tax beneﬁts for college expenses
by introducing the Hope and Lifetime Learning tax credits.2 Tax-based college aid was further
expanded in 2001 with the introduction of a tuition deduction. Table 1 shows the annual
number of tax returns claiming these beneﬁts and the dollar value claimed over the period of
my analysis. In 2005, the cost of the two education tax credits was $6.1 billion. Taxpayers
deducted another $10.8 billion of tuition and fees. With an average marginal tax rate of
22.5% in 2005, the tuition deduction cost the federal government approximately $2.4 billion.
These amounts are large relative to older tax provisions aﬀecting higher education. The Joint
Committee on Taxation (2005) estimates a cost of $0.8 billion for the exclusion of employer-
provided educational beneﬁts and a cost of $1.4 billion for the exclusion of scholarship income
in 2005.
While traditional college aid generally reduces recipients’ out-of-pocket educational ex-
penses, tax-based aid reimburses recipients for previously paid expenses. Credits reduce a
ﬁler’s tax liability. Over all of the years I analyze, the Hope credit is equal to 100% of the ﬁrst
$1000 of qualiﬁed educational expenses plus 50% of the next $1000, with a maximum reduction
in tax liability of $1500. The Hope credit is only available for expenses incurred in the ﬁrst
two years of enrollment in an undergraduate degree-granting program. The student must be
enrolled in school at least half time in at least one academic period during the year. For tax
years 1998 through 2002, the Lifetime Learning credit was equal to 20% of the ﬁrst $5000 of
expenses. Beginning in 2003, this credit has been equal to 20% of the ﬁrst $10,000 of expenses,
boosting the maximum beneﬁt from $1000 to $2000. The Lifetime Learning credit applies to
2Legislative details of this act are available from the Joint Committee on Taxation (1997).
4expenses incurred in any year of college, including graduate school. The student can be enrolled
on a less than half-time basis, and need not be working towards a degree. There is no limit on
the number of years in which a student can take the Lifetime Learning credit.
Both education tax credits were designed to be of greatest beneﬁt to the middle class.
The value of the credits to low-income ﬁlers is limited because the credits are nonrefundable.
Any credit amount in excess of tax liability cannot be claimed. The value to high-income
ﬁlers is limited by phase-outs based on adjusted gross income (AGI). When ﬁrst introduced,
the education credits phased out for unmarried ﬁlers with AGI between $40,000 and $50,000
and for joint ﬁlers with AGI between $80,000 and $100,000. The phase-out range has been
modestly increased in subsequent years. A series of AMT patches has made the credits available
to taxpayers who owe alternative minimum tax. Burman et al. (2005) document that the
education tax credits do in fact primarily beneﬁt the middle class. Households with cash
income (a broad measure including taxable income as well as transfers) between $50,000 and
$100,000 enjoyed 55.4% of total Hope beneﬁts and 48% of Lifetime Learning beneﬁts.
The tuition deduction was enacted as part of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Rec-
onciliation Act of 2001, and was ﬁrst available in tax year 2002. While a credit is subtracted
from tax liability, a deduction is subtracted from a ﬁler’s taxable income. The correspond-
ing beneﬁt to the taxpayer is equal to the amount of the deduction multiplied by the ﬁler’s
marginal tax rate. The tuition deduction is an “above-the-line” deduction, meaning that it
can be claimed both by itemizers and by those who take the standard deduction. In 2002 and
2003, taxpayers with AGI below $65,000 (or below $130,000 if ﬁling a joint return) could deduct
up to $3000 in qualiﬁed educational expenses. In 2004 and 2005, taxpayers in the same AGI
category could deduct up to $4000, while taxpayers with AGI between $65,000 and $80,000 (or
between $130,000 and $160,000 if ﬁling a joint return) could deduct up to $2000. Burman et al.
(2005) show that households with cash income between $50,000 and $100,000 received 27.1% of
beneﬁts from the tuition deduction, while households with cash income between $100,000 and
$200,000 received 51.8% of its beneﬁts in 2005.
5For all three of these tax preferences, qualiﬁed educational expenses include tuition and fees
required for enrollment at a college, university, or vocational school. Payments for room and
board, student health insurance, books, or student activities are not included. Expenses that
are paid with a loan can be claimed but expenses that are paid with a tax-free scholarship or
grant cannot be claimed. Qualiﬁed expenses can be incurred on behalf of the primary tax ﬁler,
the ﬁler’s spouse, or the ﬁler’s dependent child.3 The credits and the tuition deduction are not
available to married taxpayers who ﬁle separately.
Qualiﬁed educational expenses may be incurred for multiple individuals within a household
in a given year. For example, a parent may take college classes at the same time that her
dependent child is in college. Hope credits can be claimed for multiple students per return,
with the maximum dollar value deﬁned per student rather than per return. Thus, if neither the
parent nor the child has completed more than two years of college, the household can claim two
Hope credits, each worth up to $1500. The Lifetime Learning credit can also be claimed for
multiple students per return, but the combined value of all Lifetime Learning credits claimed
on a given return is capped at $1000 in 1998-2002 and at $2000 in 2003-2005. Similarly, the
maximum amount of the tuition deduction is deﬁned per return rather than per student. A
taxpayer cannot claim more than one tax preference for the same student in a given year.
Long (2004) demonstrates that take-up of the Hope and Lifetime Learning credits over their
ﬁrst three years fell short of initial predictions by the U.S. Department of Education. By 2000,
spending on the tax credits was only about half of what the Department of Education had
predicted. Using data from the 1999-2000 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, Long
estimates that 27% to 29% of all eligible students claimed an education tax credit. The take-
up rate is somewhat higher among older students: 32% to 34% among eligible nontraditional
undergraduates and 35% to 38% among eligible graduate and professional students.
3When the qualifying expenses are for a child’s education, the parent must claim a dependent exemption for
the child in order to claim the corresponding credit or tuition deduction. In the case of a credit, any expenses
paid directly by the dependent child are treated as having been paid by the parent. In the case of the tuition
deduction, if the dependent child pays expenses directly then neither the parent nor the child can deduct those
expenses.
6The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 included other provisions related to higher education,
all described by the Joint Committee on Taxation (1997). It introduced an above-the-line
deduction for interest paid on a student loan. This deduction phases out at middle-income AGI
levels, and most ﬁlers who are income-eligible for an education tax credit or tuition deduction
are also income-eligible for the student loan interest deduction.4 By reducing the net present
value of college costs, the interest deduction may increase college enrollment. It is possible that
some of the college attendance response I attribute to education tax credits and the tuition
deduction is actually explained by the student loan interest deduction. However, it is currently
a much smaller expenditure than the education tax credits or tuition deduction, costing the
federal government only $0.8 billion in 2005. The 1997 law also introduced education IRAs,
later known as Coverdell savings accounts. Coverdell savings accounts will not aﬀect the college
attendance of members of my sample, as contributions must be for children under age 18.
Because the delivery of substantial college aid through the tax code is a recent phenomenon,
there is only a small body of literature on the eﬀects of these tax preferences. Just prior to the
passage of the education tax credits, Cronin (1997) predicted that the proposed Hope credit
would increase college enrollment by between 150,000 and 1.4 million students by 2002. Hoxby
(1998) predicted that the Hope and Lifetime Learning credits would have only small eﬀects on
human capital investment and would instead generate tuition inﬂation, particularly at colleges
with initially low tuition and relatively immobile student bodies. Long (2004) documents the
eﬀects of the credits over their ﬁrst three years. Using October Current Population Survey
(CPS) data, Long ﬁnds no evidence that the credits changed enrollment either for those of
traditional college age, 18-24, or for those ages 25-40. Because income is available only as a
categorical variable and is topcoded at $75,000 in the October CPS, eligibility for the credits is
likely measured with error. Thus attenuation may be biasing Long’s estimates towards zero and
there is a good case for estimating the education credit enrollment eﬀects using a data set with
more precise income information. Turner (2010a) estimates the eﬀects of the tax credits and
4In my sample, 88% of those who are eligible for an education tax credit or tuition deduction would also
qualify for the student loan interest deduction.
7tuition deduction on the enrollment decisions of 18- and 19-year-olds using data from the 1996
and 2001 waves of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. He ﬁnds that the programs
have increased college enrollment rates of 18- and 19-year-olds by 2.2 percentage points, or 6.7
percent.
This paper is related to the large literature investigating the relationship between college
costs and enrollment, summarized in Leslie and Brinkman (1987), Heller (1997), and Dynarski
(2002). Nearly all of this work has focused on individuals of traditional college age, 18 to
24. One exception is a paper by Seftor and Turner (2002), which estimates the eﬀects of Pell
grants on the college enrollment of household heads, ages 22 to 35. The Pell’s 1973 introduction
is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in college enrollment of approximately 1.3 percentage
points. Tightening of the program’s deﬁnition of an independent student in 1986 is associated
with a 3.9 to 4.2 percentage point decline in enrollment. These responses are larger than what
is typically estimated for recent high school graduates. Seftor and Turner speculate that older
students may be more sensitive to federal ﬁnancial aid because they ﬁnd the application process
less daunting, because they are more credit constrained, or because they typically attend colleges
at which the undoing of federal aid through changes in institutional aid is unlikely.
2 Estimation Strategy
I rely on statutory variation in the availability and generosity of education-related tax prefer-
ences in order to estimate their enrollment eﬀects. This variation is generated by the introduc-
tion of the two credits in 1998, the introduction of the tuition deduction in 2002, and small
changes in the income eligibility for each. I use panel data to estimate ﬁxed eﬀects models of
the form:
Collegeit = β  Eligibleit + λ  Time + γ  Xit + δi + ϵit. (1)
The dependent variable is a measure of college attendance during year t. The explanatory
variable of greatest interest is Eligible, equal to one if a respondent qualiﬁes for any beneﬁt
8from the Hope credit, Lifetime Learning credit, or tuition deduction during year t. I include a
linear time trend and a vector X of time-varying demographic controls. The individual-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀect is δi.
The estimation of ﬁxed eﬀects models is useful in a context where eligibility is a function
of income. Individuals earning enough to beneﬁt from non-refundable credits may diﬀer in
systematic ways from individuals made ineligible by their low earnings, and may diﬀer in
other ways from those with income above the eligibility cutoﬀ. If unobserved determinants of
tax preference eligibility are also correlated with college attendance, cross-sectional estimates
will be biased. The number of characteristics potentially correlated with both income and
college attendance is large, including motivation and taste for school. If these characteristics
are constant over time, ﬁxed eﬀects estimation will remove them from the error term. In the
results section I show estimates from pooled cross-sectional analysis for the sake of comparison,
but my preferred speciﬁcation includes ﬁxed eﬀects.
An individual’s eligibility for a tax preference in a particular year is a function of the
prevailing tax law and his income in that year. The tax law is exogenous to the individual’s
college attendance decision, but the individual’s current income is not. For adults in their
30s and 40s, the decision to attend college plausibly involves some sacriﬁce of labor market
time and hence a reduction in income. In order to address this endogeneity, I instrument for
Eligible. My instrument predicts eligibility in year t using the tax law for year t and inﬂation-
adjusted individual income from 1997, just before the education tax credits were in eﬀect.5 This
methodology implicitly holds labor supply constant at 1997 levels. While this approach is quite
useful for identiﬁcation, there is a drawback. This analysis cannot explain how individuals with
5Using 1997 income to predict later eligibility would be problematic if taxpayers strategically altered their
1997 income in response to the passage of the education tax credits. The Taxpayer Relief Act was passed on
June 26, 1997. It speciﬁed that the Hope credit would apply to expenses paid after December 31, 1997 and
that the Lifetime Learning credit would apply to expenses paid after June 30, 1998. Income from tax year 1998
would be used to determine whether an individual could claim the credits in 1998. Even if taxpayers eventually
alter their income in order to qualify, perhaps by adjusting labor supply, there would be no reason to do so
before 1998. It is possible that passage of the law altered other behaviors. For example, savings behavior may
have changed if expectations of future college enrollment increased. The law speciﬁed that any expenses for
education provided before the tax credits became available would not be covered. Thus, the law did not create
an incentive to delay making payments on educational expenses incurred in the second half of 1997.
9substantial negative income shocks, such as job loss, may be using education tax preferences.
In addition to the key eligibility variable, I include a number of time-varying demographic
controls. I control for marital status, because the possibility of relying on a spouse’s income
may make it easier for married adults to return to college. The presence of children in the
household may reduce the time available for college, particularly for women, and so I include a
variable measuring the number of children in the household and a dummy variable indicating
whether there are any children under age six. I include an indicator for living in an urban
area as a measure of physical access to college. Jepsen and Montgomery (2009) show that
adult community college enrollment rates are quite sensitive to distance. In simulations for
their sample of Baltimore-area adults, an across-the-board one-mile increase in distance to the
nearest community college would reduce the probability of enrollment by 3 to 5%.
The same tax reforms that introduced the education tax credits and tuition deduction also
lowered marginal tax rates for many ﬁlers. It is plausible that a reduction in the marginal tax
rate will inﬂuence adult college enrollment, although the sign of the eﬀect is uncertain. A lower
tax rate increases the net return to work, and hence increases the opportunity cost of college
attendance. On the other hand, higher after-tax income may lead to greater consumption of
education. Because an individual’s marginal tax rate is a function of her income, I control for
an individual’s predicted rather than actual federal marginal tax rate. I predict this rate for
year t by applying year t tax law to 1997 income, adjusted for inﬂation.
In some speciﬁcations, I include AGI and labor supply measures in X. Interpreting the
coeﬃcients on these variables is diﬃcult, because they are likely endogenous to college enroll-
ment. Belley and Lochner (2007) show that, for individuals of traditional college age, family
income has become a more important determinant of college enrollment in recent years. While
the relationship may be diﬀerent for older adults who are not relying on parental resources,
income is likely still an important predictor of college attendance. For adults with several years
of work experience, the opportunity costs of college in terms of forgone earnings may be more
important than the sticker price of college. I hypothesize that stronger attachment to the labor
10force, as measured by weeks worked in the previous calendar year, will be associated with lower
probability of college attendance. Betts and McFarland (1995) show that community college
enrollment is quite sensitive to local unemployment rates. To investigate whether spells of un-
employment are associated with increased college attendance, I include an indicator for having
any weeks of unemployment during the calendar year prior to the interview.
I estimate Equation 1 separately for men and women. This is a sensible strategy because
many of the control variables, such as the presence of young children in the household, aﬀect
the behaviors of men and women diﬀerently, and because men’s and women’s college graduation
rates have been trending diﬀerently for decades.6 Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
3 Data
3.1 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth-1979
I use data from the 1998-2006 rounds of the NLSY79. The NLSY79, administered by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, has followed a group of 12,686 respondents ages 14-21 as of December 1978.
The survey has documented the transitions of these individuals through school and into the
workforce, with follow-up surveys conducted annually until 1994 and in even-numbered years
since then. Attrition has been relatively low, with 8399 respondents participating in the survey
in 1998. The longitudinal nature of this survey and its detailed income and college enrollment
questions make it well suited to my analysis.
The NLSY79 provides more detailed information on educational enrollment and attainment
than the October CPS, which has previously been used by Long (2004) and Seftor and Turner
(2002) to study college enrollment decisions. As in the CPS, respondents are asked about their
current enrollment status at the time of interview. In addition, each survey round includes
6Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006) show that the ratio of male to female college graduation rates has been
falling since the 1950s, and that women have had higher graduation rates since about 1980.
11retrospective questions on the beginning and ending dates of enrollment spells at up to three
colleges attended since the last interview. The dependent variable that I focus on in my analysis
is an indicator for any college enrollment in the tax year prior to the interview (the period over
which tax preference eligibility is measured).
I restrict my sample to individuals who had completed at least grade 12 by the time of
the 1998 interview. Tax preferences for college expenses are not designed, and are unlikely, to
aﬀect the behavior of those with less than a high school degree. This restriction eliminates 1015
observations, resulting in a sample of 7384 individuals, 3832 women and 3552 men.7 I use an
unbalanced panel: All of these individuals are observed in the 1998 survey round, but each can
have from zero to four observations over the next four survey rounds. NLSY79 participation
rates are quite high, and nearly 80% of the respondents in my sample are present in all ﬁve
rounds. For each year, I drop a handful of observations for whom missing income information
prevents calculation of tax liability. The regressions presented below include 17,573 person-year
observations for women and 15,942 person-year observations for men.
Weighted summary statistics for this sample are shown in Table 2. These statistics reﬂect
the distinctive nature of the NLSY79. Over the time period considered here, individuals in the
sample range in age from 33 (the youngest respondents at the time of the 1998 interview) to
50 (the oldest respondents at the time of the 2006 interview). The mean age of all person-year
observations is 41. About two-thirds of them are married and most have children. Median
adjusted gross income, in real 2005 dollars, is approximately $55,000.8
College attendance is relatively rare for my sample. Table 2 shows that across all person-
7Completing twelve years of school does not always correspond to obtaining a high school diploma. Some
individuals may complete grade 12 but not satisfy a requirement for graduation. Others may obtain a diploma
or GED after completing fewer than twelve years of schooling. I choose to deﬁne my sample in terms of grades
completed rather than highest degree obtained because I can then take advantage of a variable constructed by
NLSY staﬀ that represents extensive cross-round comparison and cleaning. Every respondent who participated
in the 1998 survey has been assigned a non-missing value for highest grade completed. If I compile information
across surveys on highest degree obtained as of 1998, this variable is missing for 300 of the 7384 individuals in
my sample. I have investigated the sensitivity of my results to a tighter sample deﬁnition. If I drop the 349
individuals with twelve years of completed schooling but who have obtained less than a high school degree or
GED, as well as the 300 with missing degree information, my results are qualitatively unchanged.
8Census data in DeNavas-Walt et al. (2006) show that median household income in 2005 was $58,084 among
households headed by a person age 35 to 44.
12year observations, only 6.7% of women and 3.4% of men attend college. Measured at the person
level, 18.4% of women and 9.9% of men attend college in at least one of the ﬁve years included
in my analysis. Figure 1 shows how this behavior has changed over time for various groups.
This ﬁgure illustrates that college attendance rates are consistently higher for women than for
men, and are generally falling as the sample ages. I divide respondents into those who are
never eligible for an education tax preference and those whose 1997 income would make them
eligible for an education tax preference in at least one subsequent year. This division of the
sample parallels the construction of my instrument. Respondents in middle-income households
fall into the eligible group, while those with income too low to beneﬁt from a nonrefundable
credit or with income above the cutoﬀ fall into the ineligible group. In 1997, the education
tax credits and tuition deduction were not yet available, but for purposes of the ﬁgure I count
a 1997 observation as income-eligible if the application of 1999 tax law to 1997 income would
qualify that respondent for an education tax credit. If education tax credits boost adult college
enrollment, I would expect the college attendance rate among eligible individuals to increase
relative to the college attendance rate among ineligibles after 1997. If the tuition deduction
boosts adult college enrollment, there should be a further widening of the college attendance
gap between eligible and ineligible individuals in 2003 and 2005. There is no evidence of such
a pattern among women. Among men, the college attendance of eligible individuals actually
falls relative to the college attendance of ineligible individuals in the ﬁrst two years in which
education credits are available. The relative rate of college attendance then increases in the next
two years, in which the tuition deduction is also available. Overall, this time series evidence
oﬀers little support for the hypothesis that education tax preferences have increased adult
college attendance.
Among those in my sample who do attend college, the majority enroll part-time at a 4-year
college. About 64% of these college students attend a 4-year college and about 62% attend
part-time. About 80% of the college students in my sample also worked 26 weeks or more
during the year. These patterns are similar for men and women.
13When ﬁrst interviewed in 1979, respondents were asked how many years of education they
expected to eventually complete. The mean expectation in my sample is 14 years, with 36%
expecting to complete 12 years, 19% expecting to complete 13 to 15 years, and 28% expecting to
complete 16 years. Table 3 compares educational expectations and the actual number of years of
education completed as of the 1998 interview. About half of male and female respondents attain
their expected level of education. About one third had completed fewer years of education by
1998 than they had expected to. I refer to this group as “incomplete learners.”
Table 4 compares incomplete learners and others on a number of observable characteristics.
The incomplete learners were more optimistic in 1979, on average reporting that they expected
to complete 15.7 years of education. The remainder of the sample expected to complete 13.4
years of education. By the time of the 1998 survey, the incomplete learners had completed
an average of 13.3 years of education while the rest of the sample had completed 14.1 years of
education. Educational expectations were collected at one point in time, 1979, from respondents
who ranged in age from 14 to 21. It seems plausible that those on the older end of this age
range might be more accurate in their predictions, and less likely to appear in the incomplete
learner group. Table 4 establishes, however, that being in the incomplete learner group is not
merely a proxy for being young. The average age at ﬁrst interview is essentially the same for
incomplete learners and for others. About 75% of the incomplete learner group is white while
83% of the remainder of the sample is white. The bottom panel of Table 4 shows summary
statistics at the respondent-year level. Among women, incomplete learners are somewhat less
likely to have a young child in the home, have lower mean and median AGI, and are more likely
to attend college at some point over the 1997-2005 period. Among men, the two groups are
fairly similar on observable characteristics. Incomplete learners are somewhat more likely to
attend college during the time of my analysis. Among all the college students in my sample,
incomplete learners are less likely to be attending a 4-year college (55% vs. 70%) and about
equally likely to be attending college part-time (61% vs. 63%).
143.2 Estimating Tax Preference Eligibility
The NLSY79 includes detailed income information, with income questions in a given round
corresponding to the previous calendar year. This information is critical for identifying which
individuals are eligible for the education tax preferences. Because I use data from the 1998 to
2006 survey rounds, I have income data for odd-numbered years from 1997 to 2005. Respon-
dents report the amounts of income received from a variety of sources. Although the NLSY79
includes a constructed summary measure of income, total net family income, this measure is in-
appropriate for determining eligibility for the education tax credits and deduction as it includes
many types of non-taxable transfer income. Instead I aggregate the taxable forms of income and
use the NBER TaxSim program to estimate each respondent’s AGI, tax liability, and marginal
tax rate.9 These TaxSim calculations are for federal taxes only, as state of residence is not
available in the public-use NLSY79 data. The lack of state tax estimates is not particularly
problematic in this context, as eligibility depends only on federal tax parameters. The taxable
income elements I use include wage income, income after expenses from any farms or businesses,
military wages, scholarship and fellowship income, unemployment compensation, income from
Social Security and disability insurance (beginning in 2001), and an “other income” category.
This category includes interest, dividends, rental income, royalties, and annuities. I include the
income of the respondent’s spouse or partner for those who report having ﬁled a joint return.
I estimate tax parameters for all respondents, even those who say that they did not ﬁle a tax
return.
The NLSY79 does not ask respondents if they itemize deductions or take the standard
deduction. Aggregate tax statistics for 1997 show that 30% of all returns and 49% of joint
returns had itemized deductions. Itemizing reduces a ﬁler’s taxable income and tax liability but
has no eﬀect on AGI. If a ﬁler has a positive tax liability with the standard deduction but zero
tax liability with itemized deductions, he cannot beneﬁt from the nonrefundable education tax
credits when he itemizes. Thus, failing to account for itemizing would cause me to overestimate
9For a description of the TaxSim program, see Feenberg and Coutts (1993).
15the number of respondents who are eligible for an education tax beneﬁt. Lacking direct evidence
on who itemizes, I use homeowner status to proxy for itemizing. Aggregate statistics from the
IRS show that expenses associated with owning a home (real estate taxes and mortgage interest)
accounted for half of the dollar value of all itemized deductions claimed in 1997. Among those
who itemized, 88% deducted real estate taxes and 83% deducted home mortgage interest. The
only type of deduction to be claimed more often by itemizers is charitable giving, reported by
89% of itemizers. In three out of the ﬁve survey rounds I use, respondents are asked if they own
or are making payments on their homes.10 I use homeownership in 1998 to proxy for itemizing
in 1997, homeownership in 2000 to proxy for itemizing in 1999 and 2001, and homeownership
in 2004 to proxy for itemizing in 2003 and 2005. I assign each imputed itemizer a dollar value
of itemized deductions equal to the average, from aggregate IRS statistics, for his ﬁling status
and AGI category.11
I use the TaxSim calculations of federal AGI, tax liability, and marginal tax rate to estimate
the maximum dollar amount of education tax preferences that a ﬁler could receive in a given
year. I estimate the value of the Hope credit, Lifetime Learning credit, and deduction separately,
adjusting for the phase-out of beneﬁts at higher levels of AGI and the limited applicability of
beneﬁts to ﬁlers with low tax liability. Because the Hope credit is restricted to expenses incurred
in the ﬁrst two years of college, I set the maximum value of the Hope beneﬁt equal to zero for
respondents who have completed two or more years of college by the time of the interview.12
If eligible for a positive beneﬁt from more than one tax preference, I assume the ﬁler chooses
the most valuable beneﬁt, as the tax law allows only one of these three tax preferences to be
claimed per student in a given year.13 None of the education tax preferences was available in
10This question is part of the asset section, which is not included in the 2002 and 2006 rounds.
11The average deduction value per itemizer, for each of 14 AGI categories and three ﬁling status categories,
comes from the Internal Revenue Service (2000).
12Hoxby (1998) points out that there is virtually no way to enforce this rule in the ﬁrst two years of the Hope
credit’s existence, as the IRS must rely on individuals’ self-reports of previous college experience. Ignoring prior
years of college experience in my calculation of tax beneﬁts has almost no eﬀect on my results. An individual
who is eligible for a non-zero beneﬁt from the Hope credit is also eligible for a non-zero beneﬁt from the Lifetime
Learning tax credit, although the dollar amount of the beneﬁt will diﬀer.
13Evidence from GAO (2008) and Turner (2010b) indicates that between 20% and 28% of taxpayers choose
suboptimally from among the available tax beneﬁts. My focus on an eligibility dummy variable rather than the
16tax year 1997, so the beneﬁt amount is equal to zero for all 1997 observations.
Figure 2 plots the maximum dollar value of education tax preference available to respon-
dents. Only respondents with AGI less than $200,000 are included, as all taxpayers with higher
incomes are ineligible for the education tax preferences. Values for 1999 are shown in the top
panel. This panel shows a concentration of respondents eligible for the maximum Hope amount
of $1500. About 43% of those who are eligible for any education tax beneﬁt in 1999 are eligible
for the full $1500. Two downward-sloping lines, one in the $40,000 to $50,000 and the other
in the $80,000 to $100,000 AGI range, represent respondents subject to the Hope’s phase-out
provisions for unmarried and married ﬁlers. There is also a concentration of respondents eli-
gible for the maximum Lifetime Learning amount of $1000. These individuals are prevented
from claiming the more generous Hope credit because they have already completed two or more
years of college. About 29% of those eligible for any education tax beneﬁt in 1999 are eligible
for $1000. Two additional downward-sloping lines, starting at a tax beneﬁt of $1000, repre-
sent respondents subject to the phase-out of the Lifetime Learning credit. Respondents with
positive tax beneﬁts of amounts other than $1000 or $1500 are either subject to the phase-out
provisions or have low tax liability which caps their beneﬁt from nonrefundable credits.
Values for 2005 are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2. While distinct Hope and Lifetime
Learning populations are evident in the 1999 ﬁgure, this is not the case in 2005. Statutory
changes had increased the maximum Lifetime Learning credit amount to $2000, and the less
restrictive Lifetime Learning credit now oﬀers the larger maximum possible beneﬁt. About 43%
of those eligible for any education tax beneﬁt in 2005 are eligible for the full $2000. Respondents
subject to the phase out of the credit are visible in AGI ranges of $43,000 to $53,000 (unmarried
ﬁlers) and $87,000 to $107,000 (joint ﬁlers). The newly available tuition deduction results in
tax beneﬁts for higher-AGI respondents. The clusters of beneﬁt values visible in the ﬁgure
reﬂect tax brackets. For example, ﬁlers who can deduct $4000 of educational expenses and who
are in the 25% tax bracket receive a beneﬁt of $1000.
dollar amount of beneﬁt makes this less of a concern in my analysis.
17I deﬁne an eligibility dummy variable equal to one if the maximum beneﬁt amount is greater
than zero. This is the key regressor in my analysis, although I also investigate the sensitivity
of my results to measuring eligibility in dollar terms.14 Table 2 indicates that about 50% of
person-year observations are eligible for an education tax preference. This masks heterogeneity
across years. No one is eligible in 1997, because none of the three tax provisions I consider was
yet available. Roughly 60% of respondents are eligible in 1999 and 2001, and the introduction
of the tuition deduction boosts the eligible share to approximately 70% by 2005.
To construct my instruments, I estimate a second set of tax parameters. I hold household
composition ﬁxed as it was in 1997, index the taxable components of income reported in 1997
for inﬂation, and apply later-year tax law in two steps. First, I use TaxSim to compute the hy-
pothetical federal AGI, tax liability, and marginal tax rate corresponding to inﬂation-adjusted
1997 income. I then use the TaxSim output and later-year education tax credit and tuition
deduction rules to compute a respondent’s predicted maximum value of education tax prefer-
ences. If this predicted dollar value is greater than zero, the predicted eligibility dummy is
equal to one. This method of constructing an instrument for a tax parameter has been used
previously, for example by Carroll et al. (2000).
Estimating a ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation requires that individuals move in or out of eligibility
over time. Individuals who are never eligible or always eligible for an education tax preference
do not contribute to identiﬁcation. Using data that span the introduction of the tax preferences
is helpful on this dimension, ensuring that no individual is always eligible. Among those who
appear in all ﬁve rounds of the survey, about 18% are never eligible. In constructing my
instrument, I isolate the change in eligibility resulting from changes in tax law—the introduction
of the credits in 1998, the introduction of the tuition deduction in 2002, and small changes in
the income eligibility thresholds. These changes are plausibly exogenous to individual college
14The dollar value that I compute is the maximum beneﬁt a person could receive, based on his AGI and tax
liability. This will overstate the beneﬁt of tax preferences to individuals with low levels of college spending,
either because they attend low-tuition colleges or because they cover most of their tuition expenses with tax-free
scholarships or grants. Aggregate tax return data published in Table 3.3 of the Statistics of Income Individual
Complete Report show that the average credit amount on returns claiming either the Hope or Lifetime Learning
credit in 2005 is $867, well below the maximum possible value.
18attendance and labor supply decisions. The number of respondents with zero years of predicted
eligibility is substantially higher than the number with zero years of actual eligibility, accounting
for about 35% of the sample. It is still the case, however, that a majority of respondents
experience a change in predicted eligibility.
4 Results
Tables 5 and 6 present estimates of the eﬀect of eligibility for the Hope credit, Lifetime Learning
credit, or tuition deduction on college attendance. The dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if the respondent reported having attended college at any point in the year prior to the
survey, the same period over which eligibility is measured. Table 5 reports results for women
and Table 6 reports results for men.
OLS estimates are shown in column 1. The coeﬃcient on Eligible is positive for both
women and men, and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for men. The coeﬃcient for men
suggests that being eligible for an education tax preference is associated with a 1.0 percentage
point increase in the probability of college attendance. This result should be interpreted with
skepticism, though, as there may be unobserved individual characteristics that aﬀect both
college attendance and the likelihood of being income-eligible for an education tax preference.
Signing the direction of the bias is diﬃcult, because eligibility for a tax preference is not a
linear function of income. Low-income ﬁlers are ineligible because they have little tax liability
to oﬀset with a credit, while high-income ﬁlers are ineligible because of the phase-out rules.
The ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation shown in column 2 removes from the error term any unobserved
individual-speciﬁc characteristics that are constant over time. This results in a smaller point
estimate of the Eligible coeﬃcient for men and a negative point estimate for women. The
potential problem with these estimates is that Eligible in year t is calculated as a function of
year t income, and year t income plausibly depends on college enrollment in year t. Again, it is
diﬃcult to sign the bias introduced by this reverse causality. Suppose that for an adult in his or
19her late 30s, the decision to attend college involves reducing labor supply and thus is associated
with lower income. For an individual initially earning too much to qualify for an education tax
preference, the decline in earnings may make him newly eligible. In this case, there will be a
spurious positive correlation between eligibility and college attendance. On the other hand, a
decline in earnings associated with college enrollment could move an individual from the eligible
range to having too little tax liability to beneﬁt from a nonrefundable credit. In this case, there
will be a spurious negative correlation between eligibility and college attendance.
To address the endogeneity of tax preference eligibility, I instrument for Eligible using
information on the tax code in year t and an individual’s income in 1997. The ﬁrst-stage results
show a very strong relationship between the instrument (eligibility predicted by applying later-
year tax law to inﬂation-adjusted 1997 income) and the endogenous eligibility dummy. For
women, the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcient on the instrument is 0.498, with a t statistic of 49. For men,
the coeﬃcient on the instrument is 0.523, with a t statistic of 51. Second-stage results are
shown in column 3 of Tables 5 and 6.15 In this preferred speciﬁcation, there is no evidence
that tax preferences aﬀect the college attendance of adults. For both women and men, the
coeﬃcients on Eligible are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. In a speciﬁcation not shown in
the table, I have pooled together men and women. For this combined sample, the eligibility
coeﬃcient is near zero and insigniﬁcant.
The eﬀects of other covariates are generally consistent across speciﬁcations. There is a
negative time trend for both men and women, reﬂecting the fact that college attendance de-
clines with age. Being married and having any child under the age of six signiﬁcantly reduce
a woman’s probability of attending college, but have essentially no eﬀect on men’s college at-
tendance. There is no signiﬁcant relationship between a respondent’s marginal tax rate and
college attendance.
In column 4, I add a set of potentially endogenous control variables: AGI (measured in
tens of thousands) and its square, the number of weeks worked last year, and an indicator for
15The sample size is somewhat smaller here because individuals with only one year of data are not used in
this speciﬁcation.
20any weeks of unemployment last year. Reassuringly, adding these controls generates very little
change in the key Eligible coeﬃcient. The pattern of coeﬃcients on AGI and AGI squared
indicates that college attendance is declining with income over much of the income range,
only becoming positive at an AGI of around $500,000. While the usual ﬁnding is that college
attendance increases with income over most of the income range, evidence of the opposite
pattern here is not particularly troubling. It is quite plausible that the relationship between
enrollment rates of dependent 18-year-olds and parental income is strongly positive while the
relationship between the enrollment rates of adults and household income is generally negative.
Stronger attachment to the labor force, as measured by the number of weeks worked in the past
year, is associated with a lower probability of college attendance for women. Experiencing any
weeks of unemployment in the past year is not signiﬁcantly correlated with college attendance.
The last two columns of Tables 5 and 6 show ﬁxed eﬀects IV regression results for the sub-
sample of incomplete learners, those whose actual 1998 educational attainment falls below their
1979 expectations. The ﬁrst-stage regressions for incomplete learners show that the instrument
is a strong predictor of eligibility. For female incomplete learners the coeﬃcient on the instru-
ment is 0.507 with a t statistic of 32 and for male incomplete learners the coeﬃcient on the
instrument is 0.496 with a t statistic of 31. In the second stage, the coeﬃcient on eligibility
is insigniﬁcant for women and positive and signiﬁcant for men. Among the sample of male
incomplete learners, being eligible for a tax beneﬁt is associated with a 3.4 percentage point
increase in the probability of college attendance.16 The coeﬃcients on other control variables
are generally similar to estimates for the full sample. Adding controls for AGI, weeks worked,
and unemployment in column 6 does not change the main result: Eligibility for an education
tax credit has a large positive eﬀect on the probability of college attendance among male in-
complete learners. If I estimate a single regression pooling together male and female incomplete
learners, the Eligible coeﬃcient indicates a 2.2 percentage point college attendance response,
16OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations also indicate a positive and signiﬁcant, although smaller, response among
male incomplete learners. The point estimates from these regressions indicate a 1.7 percentage point increase
in the probability of college attendance. For female incomplete learners, an OLS regression indicates a positive
enrollment response but the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation suggests a near-zero response.
21signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Not surprisingly, individuals who are classiﬁed as incomplete learners have relatively low
levels of education as of the 1998 survey. It is possible that the relevant distinction between
incomplete learners and others is actually the level of education attained as of 1998, rather than
how this attainment compares to 1979 expectations. To investigate this possibility, I restrict
my sample to individuals who had completed between 12 and 15 years of schooling as of the
1998 interview. With this restriction in place, the Eligible coeﬃcient from the ﬁxed eﬀects
IV speciﬁcation is 0.005 with a standard error of 0.014 for women. For men, the coeﬃcient
is 0.018 with a standard error of 0.008. Next, I restrict my sample to those whose highest
degree obtained as of 1998 is at least a high school diploma (or GED) and something less than
a bachelor’s degree. In this case, the ﬁxed eﬀects IV speciﬁcation yields an Eligible coeﬃcient
of 0.001 (0.015) for women and 0.012 (0.008) for men. These results suggest that unrealized
educational expectations, distinct from low initial levels of education, do in fact play a role in
determining the responsiveness to education tax preferences.
A 3.4 percentage point increase in the probability of college attendance is a very large
eﬀect, given that college attendance is reported for only 4% of person-year observations of male
incomplete learners. This estimate is also large relative to other estimates from the college
enrollment literature. Turner (2010a) ﬁnds that the Hope credit, Lifetime Learning credit,
and tuition deduction have increased full-time college enrollment of 18- and 19-year-olds by
2.2 percentage points, relative to a baseline enrollment rate of 30%. Seftor and Turner (2002)
estimate that eligibility for the Pell grant over its ﬁrst four full years of existence, 1974 to 1977,
increased the probability of college attendance among household heads ages 22 to 35 by about
1.5 percentage points. Seftor and Turner’s results for women are quite robust to the deﬁnition
of the treatment group and to alternative sample restrictions, but the results for men vary.
When all college enrollment is considered, instead of undergraduate enrollment only, the point
estimate for men suggests that Pell eligibility is associated with a 2.7 to 2.9 percentage point
increase in college attendance. In comparing the magnitude of these estimates to mine, it is
22important to note that the typical Pell grant of the 1974-1977 period is more generous, in real
terms, than the average value of the education tax preferences. Cook and King (2007) report
the dollar amount of the average Pell grant in each year since its inception. Averaged over
1974 to 1977, the typical Pell grant amount is approximately $2575, expressed in real 2005
dollars. In contrast, the average credit amount on returns claiming either the Hope or Lifetime
Learning credit in 2005 is $867. Because my baseline estimate for male incomplete learners is
surprisingly large, it is important to investigate the robustness of this result.
4.1 Robustness Checks
In this section I vary the assumptions made about tax ﬁling behavior, I consider alternative
sample deﬁnitions, and I replace the eligibility dummy variable with a dollar value measure.
The ﬁnding of a large college attendance response among male incomplete learners and an
insigniﬁcant response among other groups is robust to these changes.
To this point, I have computed the potential tax beneﬁt in the same way for all respondents,
regardless of whether they reported ﬁling a tax return. In practice, of course, it is necessary to
ﬁle in order to receive any tax beneﬁt. I estimate an alternative speciﬁcation in which I treat
all self-reported non-ﬁlers as ineligible for education tax preferences. The corresponding ﬁxed
eﬀects IV results are shown in row B of Table 7. Only among the male incomplete learners
is there evidence that the education tax preferences increase college attendance. The point
estimate is somewhat smaller than in the baseline, suggesting that tax preference eligibility is
associated with a 2.8 percentage point increase in the probability of college attendance. As a
second alternative, I drop non-ﬁlers and estimate regressions only for those who report having
ﬁled a tax return. This reduces sample sizes by about 15%. The results of the corresponding
ﬁxed eﬀects IV regressions are shown in row C of Table 7. Dropping non-ﬁlers generates results
that are quite similar to the baseline.
Taken together, the ﬁrst three rows of Table 7 indicate that the ﬁnding of a large college
attendance response among male incomplete learners and no attendance response among other
23groups is relatively stable to the way in which I treat reported non-ﬁlers. While this is reas-
suring, there are two reasons why I prefer the baseline speciﬁcation. First, reports of non-ﬁling
may be inaccurate. The non-ﬁling rate is higher in the NLSY79 than in the population, rising
from 11.5% for tax year 1997 to an unrealistically high 25.2% for tax year 2005. Many respon-
dents who report that they did not ﬁle a tax return simultaneously report income well above
the ﬁling threshold. This issue becomes more striking in later years. For tax year 1997, 59%
of those who say they do not ﬁle appear to be legitimate non-ﬁlers, with AGI below the ﬁling
threshold.17 By 2005, only 23% of those who say they do not ﬁle have AGI below the ﬁling
threshold. Second, it is possible that the decision to ﬁle is inﬂuenced by the set of tax pref-
erences available. Computing the potential tax beneﬁt in the same way regardless of reported
ﬁling status, as I do in the baseline, ensures that the key regressor is a plausibly exogenous
measure of eligibility.
My baseline speciﬁcation assumes that homeowners itemize deductions. In row D of Table
7 I instead assume that all respondents take the standard deduction. In this speciﬁcation, the
eligibility coeﬃcient for male incomplete learners falls to 2.5 percentage points, signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. The eligibility coeﬃcient for female incomplete learners is nearly as large in
magnitude, but is imprecisely estimated.
The research design in this paper assumes that when education tax preferences become
available to middle-income individuals, patterns of college enrollment among the ineligibles
are the same as they would have been absent the introduction of the tax preferences. This
assumption will be violated if other policy changes are simultaneously inﬂuencing the college
enrollment patterns among ineligibles. The group of individuals ineligible for an education
tax preference contains two distinct subsets. There are low-income individuals with too little
income to beneﬁt from a non-refundable credit, and high-income individuals with AGI above
the eligibility thresholds. The college attendance of those in the low-income control group
may have been aﬀected by welfare reform of the mid-1990s. This reform made welfare receipt
17In 1997, the ﬁling threshold is $6800 for single ﬁlers, $12200 for joint ﬁlers, and $8700 for head of household
ﬁlers. These amounts are adjusted annually for inﬂation.
24contingent on participation in a work-related activity. In some states, attending college satisﬁes
the work requirements for welfare. If changes in state welfare rules caused college enrollment
of low-income individuals to increase (decrease) over my sample period, my estimates of the
college enrollment eﬀects of education tax preferences, particularly for women, will be biased
downwards (upwards).18 To address this issue, I drop those in the low-income control group
and re-estimate college attendance regressions. The corresponding results are shown in row
E of Table 7. Relative to the baseline, this change has very little eﬀect on the results. Only
among male incomplete learners is there evidence that education tax preferences have aﬀected
college attendance.
There is not an obvious counterpoint policy change that would have aﬀected the college
attendance of those earning too much to qualify for education tax preferences. For the sake of
completeness, though, I drop the high-income control group. The results from this speciﬁcation
indicate that there is a near-zero and insigniﬁcant eﬀect of education tax preference eligibility
on college attendance for the full sample of women and for the full sample of men. For female
incomplete learners, the point estimate on Eligible is 0.014 with a standard error of 0.021. For
male incomplete learners, the Eligible coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level, with a point
estimate of 0.026 and a standard error of 0.015. Dropping the high-income control group does
not change the general pattern of results.
The instrument that I have constructed applies later-year tax law to income from 1997,
just before any education tax preferences were available. Income from a single year will reﬂect
both permanent income and transitory shocks particular to that year. The larger the transitory
shocks, the weaker my instrument. To reduce the impact of transitory income shocks, I con-
struct an alternative instrument. I average income from the two surveys prior to the availability
of education tax preferences, corresponding to tax years 1995 and 1997.19 I then apply later-
18According to the Welfare Rules Database assembled by the Urban Institute, in 1996, on the eve of federal
welfare reform, there were 41 states (including D.C.) that allowed welfare recipients to be attending postsec-
ondary education. In 1997, 27 states counted postsecondary education as satisfying a work requirement. There
is some variation within states over time on this issue, and by 2005 there were 32 states in which postsecondary
education satisﬁed a work requirement.
19For individuals who are present in the 1998 survey but not in the 1996 survey, I continue to use 1997 income
25year tax law to this average income, indexed for inﬂation. The results with this instrument are
shown in row F of Table 7. In this speciﬁcation, tax preference eligibility is associated with
a 2.9 percentage point increase in the probability of college attendance for male incomplete
learners. The estimated eﬀect of tax preference eligibility is insigniﬁcant for all other groups.
Next, I try replacing the eligibility dummy variable with the dollar value of potential beneﬁt
from education tax preferences. Dollar amounts are measured in thousands. This speciﬁcation
takes advantage of the additional variation in potential beneﬁt size that is illustrated in Figure
2. This variation comes from cross-sectional variation in AGI and tax liability as well as from
changes in the beneﬁt computation over time.20 The results of the corresponding ﬁxed eﬀects
IV estimates are shown in row G of Table 7. In this speciﬁcation, there is again evidence of a
college attendance response for male incomplete learners. Being eligible for $1000 of education-
related tax beneﬁts is associated with a 2.8 percentage point increase in the probability of
college attendance. The coeﬃcient for female incomplete learners is also signiﬁcant at the 10%
level and is quite large, 3.5 percentage points.
Table 7 shows that, across several diﬀerent speciﬁcations, eligibility for an education tax
preference increases the college attendance of male incomplete learners by 2.5 to 3.4 percentage
points. The eﬀect for female incomplete learners is generally not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, although large standard errors make it impossible to rule out similar-sized eﬀects for
men and women. I have investigated several reasons why the responses of male and female
incomplete learners might be diﬀerent. First, it is plausible that the costs of adult college
enrollment are lower for those who are closer to achieving their initial educational expectations.
Men may have a stronger response to education tax preferences if they have smaller educational
gaps to close. However, male incomplete learners are no closer to their expected educational
attainment than are female incomplete learners. The gap between expected and actual years of
only.
20When I replace the eligibility dummy with the dollar value of education tax preferences, it is possible to
drop all ineligible individuals and estimate a regression identiﬁed solely from dollar value variation across eligible
individuals. In practice, there is not suﬃcient variation in my dollar value estimates for this to be a meaningful
exercise. The resulting estimates are extremely noisy.
26education is 2.6 years for male incomplete learners and 2.4 years for female incomplete learners.
Second, it is possible that men face higher returns to mid-career college attendance because of
gendered patterns of employment by industry. My data indicate that men are more likely to
work in declining industries such as manufacturing, while women are more likely to be in growing
industries such as education- and health-related services. If industry diﬀerences account for the
signiﬁcant response among men, then I should see a large response to tax preference eligibility
among the set of all workers, men and women, initially employed in manufacturing. This pattern
is not present in the data. Finally, the opportunity costs of adult college enrollment may be
higher for women because they face substantial child care responsibilities. If this explains the
diﬀerent responses of men and women, then results for female incomplete learners without
children should mirror the results for male incomplete learners. There is inconclusive support
for this explanation. A regression for female incomplete learners without children under 6 at
any point over 1997-2005 produces a large and imprecisely estimated coeﬃcient, 0.027 with a
standard error of 0.032.
4.2 Degree Completion
The Lifetime Learning tax credit and the tuition deduction are not restricted to students en-
rolled in degree-granting programs. While students may derive satisfaction or useful skills from
coursework that does not eventually lead to a degree, the labor market tends to reward degrees.
For example, Jaeger and Page (1996) demonstrate that the labor market return to obtaining
a diploma exceeds the return to merely completing the number of years of schooling typically
associated with that degree. Despite the substantial return to completing a degree, Bound,
Lovenheim, and Turner (2010) show that the share of the population with some college experi-
ence but no college degree is actually rising, particularly among men. Dynarski (2008) ﬁnds that
degree completion among students of traditional college age is sensitive to costs. She shows that
introduction of generous state merit scholarships for recent high school graduates in Arkansas
and Georgia is associated with a 3 percentage point increase in the share of the population
27that has completed a college degree. If merit scholarships have increased degree completion
among students of traditional college age, it is plausible that education tax preferences may
have increased degree receipt among older students, many of whom have some earlier college
experience. I next investigate whether eligibility for an education tax preference is associated
with an increased probability of degree receipt.
In each of the NLSY79 survey rounds that I use, respondents who have reported attending
college are asked if they have obtained any kind of academic degree since the last interview. I
estimate ﬁxed eﬀects IV regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one
if a respondent answers yes to this question.21 The results of these regressions are shown in
Table 8. There is no evidence that eligibility for an education tax preference aﬀects the prob-
ability of degree receipt. For each group that I consider, the Eligible coeﬃcient is statistically
insigniﬁcant and quite close to zero. This is true in speciﬁcations using an eligibility dummy
variable and in speciﬁcations that use the dollar value of education-related tax preferences for
which an individual is eligible. It is also true when I restrict the sample to respondents with
some previous college experience as of the 1997 interview.
4.3 Heterogeneity of Responses by Savings Level
The previous results demonstrate that, across a number of speciﬁcations, eligibility for an
education tax credit or tuition deduction increases the probability of college attendance among
men whose 1997 educational levels fall short of their 1979 expectations. Next I show that
within this group, the response diﬀers by level of savings. There will typically be a long lag
between when a person pays higher education expenses and when he receives the beneﬁt from
an education tax credit or tuition deduction. For example, if a person enrolls in college and
pays tuition in January of 2004, he can claim a credit or deduction when he ﬁles his 2004 tax
return in the early months of 2005. This lag may not be problematic for individuals with liquid
21For respondents who have participated in all ﬁve interviews, the dependent variable always spans a two-year
period. For respondents who have missed an interview, the dependent variable spans a longer period. In either
case, the tax year in which eligibility is measured is a subset of the period over which degree receipt is measured.
28assets. However, it can limit the usefulness of the tax preferences to individuals who have low
levels of assets and who face credit constraints.
I use information on asset values to identify individuals with low balances in savings accounts
as of the 1998 interview. I divide the sample into those with a zero balance, those with a non-
zero balance, and those with a balance above the median. About 28% of male incomplete
learners had no money in a savings account as of the 1998 interview, and the median 1998
savings account balance for all male incomplete learners is $1750. Panel A of Table 9 reports
the results of college attendance regressions by savings level. For those with no money in a
savings account, the coeﬃcient on Eligible is near zero although very imprecisely estimated.
For those with a non-zero savings account balance, eligibility for an education tax preference
is associated with a 4.3 percentage point increase in the probability of college attendance. The
eﬀect is even larger, 5.0 percentage points, among those with more than the median level of
savings. This pattern of results is consistent with the possibility that credit constraints prevent
some eligible individuals from making use of education tax preferences.
The savings account balance measured at one point in time may be a very weak proxy
for credit constraints. As an alternative, I average each individual’s reported savings account
balances from the years in which asset questions were included (1998, 2000, and 2004). About
13% of male incomplete learners have a zero average savings account balance, and the median
value, measured in real 2005 dollars, is $3287. This average balance is likely to suﬀer from less
measurement error than is the savings account balance measured in one year only. On the other
hand, it may be endogenous to college enrollment during my period of analysis. It is likely that
adults who choose to enroll in college draw down their savings to pay for it. Panel B of Table
9 shows the results of dividing the sample on the basis of average savings account balances.
For those with a zero average balance, the point estimate on the eligibility term is near zero.
With only 717 observations in this regression, though, this is a very imprecise estimate. Among
those with a non-zero average savings account balance, the coeﬃcient on Eligible indicates a
3.4 percentage point college attendance response, signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The estimated
29eﬀect is again larger for those with above-median levels of savings.
5 Conclusion
The tax code plays an increasingly important role in the delivery of college ﬁnancial aid. In 2005,
federal spending on the Hope tax credit, Lifetime Learning tax credit, and tuition deduction
was $8.5 billion, slightly more than half of federal Pell grant spending. This paper makes two
contributions to the growing literature on the eﬀectiveness of tax-based college aid. First, it uses
long-run panel data and ﬁxed eﬀects IV estimation to identify the college attendance response.
Second, it focuses on adults in their 30s and 40s. The Lifetime Learning credit and the tuition
deduction are available to students enrolled in as little as one college class, cover expenses for
any year of college or graduate school, and can be claimed for an unlimited number of years.
These features make the tax beneﬁts accessible to adults returning to college after some time
oﬀ and to those who are combining work and an occasional college course.
I use data from the 1998-2006 rounds of the NLSY79 to investigate how eligibility for
an education tax preference aﬀects the college attendance decision. I estimate ﬁxed eﬀects
regressions, instrumenting for eligibility by applying current-year tax law to income as of 1997,
just before tax provisions for college expenses were in eﬀect. In the full sample of women and
in the full sample of men, the decision to attend college is not aﬀected by the tax credits or
tuition deduction. There is evidence of a strong positive enrollment eﬀect among a subsample
of adult men, those whose educational expectations as teenagers had not been met as of 1998.
Among this group, about one-third of the full sample of men, being eligible for an education
tax preference is associated with a 2.5 to 3.4 percentage point increase in the probability of
college attendance. This eﬀect is large and persistent across a number of robustness checks.
Among the group of women whose initial educational expectations had not been met as of 1998,
eligibility for an education tax preference does not aﬀect college attendance.
The overlap between tax policy and postsecondary educational policy is growing. Students
30of traditional college age are not the only group in a position to beneﬁt from tax-based college
aid. This paper demonstrates that, between 1999 and 2005, education tax preferences increased
college attendance among a particular subset of adult men. The potential for education tax
preferences to promote college attendance among adults is likely to be even greater in a period
of extended economic downturn, industrial restructuring, and high unemployment rates.
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33Table 1: Description of Major Tax Preferences for Higher Education
Tax Credits Tuition Deduction
# of Total Max Max # of Total Max
Returns Dollars Hope LLTC Returns Dollars Beneﬁt
Claiming Claimed Claiming Deducted
1998 4,652,596 3,376,647 1500 1000
1999 6,436,654 4,772,443 1500 1000
2000 6,815,316 4,851,178 1500 1000
2001 7,212,554 5,156,254 1500 1000
2002 6,475,134 4,882,853 1500 1000 3,444,941 6,154,145 3000MTR
2003 7,298,185 5,842,966 1500 2000 3,571,154 6,683,631 3000MTR
2004 7,180,884 6,016,805 1500 2000 4,710,253 10,589,279 4000MTR
2005 7,057,251 6,119,631 1500 2000 4,696,013 10,846,990 4000MTR
Note: Data on the number of returns claiming each beneﬁt and on the dollar values claimed come from annual
versions of the Individual Complete Report published by the Statistics of Income division of the Internal Revenue
Service. Data on the tax credits come from Table 3.3, All Returns: Tax Liability, Tax Credits, and Tax
Payments. Data on the tuition deduction come from Table 1.4, All Returns: Sources of Income, Adjustments,
and Tax Items. Total dollars claimed and total dollars deducted are in thousands. The maximum Hope amount
is deﬁned per student and the maximum Lifetime Learning credit amount is deﬁned per return.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Regression Sample
Women Men
Age 41 41
% Married 66.7 66.5
Number of Children in Household 1.50 1.25
% with Any Children Under 6 42.5 59.7
Mean Adjusted Gross Income 69748 75559
Median Adjusted Gross Income 54146 60000
% Urban 65.5 66.2
% with Any Unemployment 7.4 7.6
Weeks Worked Last Year 40.0 46.2
% Eligible for Education Tax Preference 48.5 51.9
% Attended College Last Year 6.7 3.4
% Attaining Less Education than Expected 33.2 34.7
N 17573 15942
Note: The table reports weighted means, using a year-speciﬁc weighting variable constructed by the NLSY staﬀ.
The unit of observation is the respondent-year. A respondent can be observed in one to ﬁve years. This table
includes observations from 3552 men and 3832 women. Adjusted gross income is reported in real 2005 dollars.
34Table 3: Educational Expectations and Actual Years of Education
Women Men
Actual Years Completed, 1998 Actual Years Completed, 1998
Expected Years 12 13-15 16 > 16 12 13-15 16 > 16
Less than 12 94 18 5 1 121 17 2 1
12 1078 247 44 18 1120 200 31 14
13-15 339 383 77 36 314 201 48 16
16 222 403 293 173 287 318 255 137
More than 16 43 110 114 134 53 118 134 165
Note: Data on the number of years of education a respondent expects to complete come from 1979, the ﬁrst
round of the survey. All respondents were interviewed in this year, although a handful do not answer the
educational expectation question. These respondents are categorized as expecting to complete fewer than 12
years of education.
Table 4: Comparison of Incomplete Learners and Others
Women Men
Incomplete Others Incomplete Others
Learners Learners
A. Summary Statistics at Respondent Level
Educational Expectation as of 1979 15.6 13.4 15.8 13.4
Educational Attainment as of 1998 13.3 14.1 13.3 14.0
Age at First Interview 17.7 17.8 18.0 17.7
% White 75.0 83.8 74.0 83.1
N 1378 2454 1313 2239
B. Summary Statistics at Respondent-Year Level
% Married 64.4 67.8 64.7 67.4
Number of Children in Household 1.54 1.48 1.24 1.25
% with Any Children Under 6 39.8 43.8 60.5 59.3
Mean Adjusted Gross Income 66489 71371 74354 76200
Median Adjusted Gross Income 51500 55612 59668 60000
% Urban 68.6 63.9 71.0 63.7
% with Any Unemployment 7.8 7.1 8.2 7.3
Weeks Worked Last Year 39.2 40.4 45.9 46.4
% Eligible for Education Tax Preference 49.2 48.2 51.8 51.9
% Attended College Last Year 8.1 6.0 4.0 3.1
N 6329 11244 5887 10055
Note: The table reports weighted means, using a year-speciﬁc weighting variable constructed by the NLSY staﬀ.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 7: Robustness Checks: Coeﬃcients on Eligible, Fixed Eﬀects IV Regressions
Female Male
All Women All Men Incomplete Incomplete
Learners Learners
A. Baseline
-0.019 0.006 0.013 0.034**
(0.013) (0.009) (0.021) (0.015)
B. Setting Benet=0 for Reported Non-Filers
-0.014 0.005 0.001 0.028**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.016) (0.011)
C. Dropping Reported Non-Filers
-0.019 0.004 0.014 0.031*
(0.013) (0.009) (0.022) (0.016)
D. Assuming Standard Deduction
-0.020* 0.005 0.020 0.025*
(0.012) (0.008) (0.021) (0.015)
E. Dropping Low-Income Ineligibles
-0.018 0.004 0.003 0.034**
(0.013) (0.008) (0.021) (0.015)
F. Instrument Using Two Years of Income Data
-0.018 0.004 0.009 0.029*
(0.013) (0.009) (0.022) (0.016)
G. Replacing Eligibility Dummy with Dollar Amount
0.014 0.008 0.035* 0.028**
(0.011) (0.008) (0.019) (0.014)
Note: Each cell of the table represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1% level.
38Table 8: Degree Completion Results, Fixed Eﬀects IV Regressions
Female Male
All Women All Men Incomplete Incomplete
Learners Learners
A. Eligibility Dummy
0.002 -0.004 0.007 -0.0002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
B. Dollar Value of Education Tax Preference (1000s)
0.0002 -0.006 0.013 -0.003
(0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008)
Note: Each cell of the table represents a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level and ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 9: Heterogeneity of Responses by Savings Level, Male Incomplete Learners
Zero Non-Zero Above
Balance Balance Median
A. Using 1998 savings account balance
-0.006 0.043*** 0.050**
(0.046) (0.016) (0.020)
N 1612 4207 2903
B. Using average savings account balance
-0.005 0.034* 0.049*
(0.052) (0.016) (0.021)
N 717 5110 2955
Note: The table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors on the Eligible variable from ﬁxed eﬀects IV regressions.
The sample is restricted to men whose 1979 report of expected educational attainment exceeds the level of
attainment attained as of the 1998 interview. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1% level.
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Note: Dollar amounts are reported in nominal terms. Respondents with AGI above $200,000, all of whom
receive zero beneﬁt from education tax preferences, are omitted from the ﬁgure.
41